1 The key question in 2017 is what effect this reorganization, and the accompanying program of massive investment in rearmament and reequipment, has had on Russia’s capability to engage and prevail in conflict.īoth the equipment and organizational aspects of the Russian military’s current development present challenges. The extensive and painful history of Russia’s military reorganization under former defense minister Anatoliy Serdyukov and its continuation and revision under current Defense Minister Sergey Shoygu has been described in detail and will not be repeated here. This white paper also considers short-term timelines of opportunities versus threats-perceived or actual-for the Russian military, before concluding with a number of broad recommendations. Individual sections discuss a range of current factors affecting overall capability that are still in flux, including issues of affordability, manning, organizational development, and the implementation of lessons learned from Ukraine and Syria. Snapshots of Russia’s capability displayed in Ukraine and Syria tend to conceal ongoing developments the true capability of the Russian military is not static but a rapidly developing phenomenon.Īs such, this broad overview of Russia’s military capability in 2017 should not be taken as a definitive description but rather an indicator of trends. Two points are beyond argument: First, in terms of equipment, experience, attitude, confidence, and more, the Russian military is a radically different force from the one that began the process of transformation in 2008. Russia’s reorganized and rearmed Armed Forces are neither invincible nor still broken and incapable. He is also a director of the Conflict Studies Research Center, a group of subject matter experts in Eurasian security. Keir Giles is an associate fellow in the Russia and Eurasia Program at Chatham House.